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NORTH DAKOTA'S TEN-YEAR STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS, PART I
HENRY G. RUEMMELE*
C HATER 158 of the Session Laws of the State of North Dakota
for 1899 was approved on March 8, 1899, and took effect on
July 1, 1899, pursuant to the constitutional provision that unless
a bill is passed as an emergency act it shall take effect on the
following July first.
Chapter 158 read:
"AN ACT RELATING TO TrrIS TO REAL PIoPERTY. All titles to
real property vested in any person or persons who have been
or hereafter may be in the actual, open, adverse and undis-
puted possession of the land under such title for a period
of 10 years and shall have paid all taxes and assessments
legally levied thereon, shall be and the same are declared
good and valid in the law, any law to the contrary notwith-
standing."
The statute became Section 3491a of the Revised Codes of 1899,
and without change Section 4928 of the Revised Codes of 1905,
Section 5471 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, and by merely leaving
off the words "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" Section
47-0603 of the Revised Code of 1943. Chapter 276 of the 1951
Session Laws amended Section 47-0603, and the changes which
the amendments endeavor to make will be discussed after a con-
sideration of the law from the time of its passage in 1899 to
Chapter 276.
There were at the time the statute was enacted 20-year statutes
of limitation ' and therefore the only conclusion which can be
drawn is that the enactment of Chapter 158 was intended to
shorten the period for acquiring title by adverse possession in a
given situation, a conclusion which is consistent with the view
that the law favors certainty of ownership and encourages alien-
ability.
In Streeter Co. v. Frederickson,2 in a case where the plaintiff
brought an action to quiet -title as against a defendant claiming
through grantors who had secured the property by tax deed, the
Court stated, "The statute under consideration is entirely unlike
* Ph.B., LL.B., Lecturer in Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. Mr.
Ruemmele is associated with the Grand Forks Abstracting Company.
1. N.D. Rev. Codes §§5187-5197 (1895). These have now become §§28-0103 - 28-0113,
N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
2. 11 N.D. 300, 91 N.W. 692 (1902).
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the statutes of limitation common in most of the states, and also
the 20-year limitation statute. In fact, it is so dissimilar that its
identity as a statute of limitations is almost obscure." 3
Discussing the statute in Woolfolk v. Albrecht,' a quiet title
action brought against a defendant who claimed through a tax
deed, the Court stated that, "The contention, in effect, that the
statute .. . is merely a statute of limitations, and may not be
used as a sword of attack, but only as a shield of defense, is with-
out merit. By the express language of this section, as well as the
preceding one, a compliance therewith operates to confer a good
and valid title, and we know of no reason why a title thus ac-
quired cannot be asserted by its owner in exactly the same man-
ner as a title acquired in any other way." 5
In Schauble v. Schulz,6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
said: "Unlike ordinary statutes of limitation which convert ad-
verse possession into perfect title after a prescribed period of
years, this statute contains a provision designed to encourage the
payment of taxes and assessments on land the title to which is
uncertain, and, as a protection to one who unites adverse pos-
session for the period of 10 years with the payment of all taxes
and assessments for those years, it declares his title good and
valid, although the period of adverse possession otherwise in ef-
fect under the laws of the state is 20 years .. . In a limited
sense the statute partakes of the nature of a revenue measure
which, consistent with due process of law, may have a more sum-
mary operation than other laws ... " 7
It would seem that whether the statute is one of limitation or
not, it may be used to assert a title, and to defeat a claim of title,
and in its inception undoubtedly served to shorten the period
within which an owner could successfully maintain an action
for the recovery of his property from an adverse possessor, who
had met all the requirements of the statute.
The first occasion that the North Dakota Supreme Court had
to consider the statute was in Power v. Kitching, in which the
Court said that,
"The benefits of the statute are intended for all who are vested
with imperfect titles to real estate, and are not limited to
3. Id. at 303, 91 N.W. at 694.
4. 22 N.D. 36, 133 N.W. 310 (1911).
5. Id. at 45, 133 N.W. at 314.
6. 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
7. Id. at 392.
8. 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901).
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persons holding tax titles. The statute .. .establishes a mode
and manner of acquiring title to land which is new to this
state. Under this statute title is not acquired until each of
three prescribed conditions are fully met:
1. The claimant must be vested with some sort of title;
2. he must occupy the land, under claim of title thereto,
openly, adversely, and exclusively for a period of 10 years;
3. the claimant must pay all taxes assessed against the land
for such period."
Again, in Streeter Co. v. Frederickson, supra, the Court stated
that, "By the language employed in the statute under considera-
tion-and it is not ambiguous-the legislature of this state ex-
tended the benefit of its provisions not to all persons indiscrimi-
nately, but to certain persons; that is, to persons who have been
or may hereafter be in the actual, open and undisputed pos-
session of land for 10 years, and who shall have paid all taxes
and assessments legally levied thereon. It is the title of persons
complying with these conditions which are declared good and
valid in law, and the titles of no other persons. There is no lan-
guage in the statute which can be construed as extending the
benefit of its provisions to persons or in aid of titles other than
those described." 10
Thus, in order to take advantage of this statute, there are three
requirements, which will be hereinafter discussed under the head-
ings of Color of Title, Adverse Possession, and Payment of Taxes.
1. COLOR OF TITLE
The statute merely states that "All titles to real property vested
in any person or persons . .. shall be . . .declared good and
valid in the law . . ." and naturally the first question which
would face the Court would be a determination of just what sort
of titles the Legislature had in mind.
The Court, in Power v. Kitching, supra, stated that "The act of
1899 does not attempt to define the nature of the title upon which
the claimant under the statute may rest as a basis upon which
to build up a title by adverse possession and the payment of
taxes,"1" and that "the benefits of the statute are intended for all
who are vested with imperfect titles to real estate ... ,, 12
In that case, the defendant had purchased the land involved from
a county which had taken it for taxes, and he secured a deed which
9. Id. at 260, 86 N.W. at 739.
10. 11 N.D. at 303, 91 N.W. at 694.
11. 10 N.D. at 260, 86 N.W. at 739-40.
12. Id. at 260, 86 N.W. at 739.
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apparently was void on its face in 1889. He immediately went
into possession, fenced part of the land, farmed another portion,
placed buildings on the land and resided on it for a continuous
period of over 10 years after he received the deed, in the mean-
time paying the taxes charged against the property. In 1900 the
previous owner brought an action to recover the possession and
the value of the use of the land. It was conceded that the tax as-
sessment was void, as was the tax deed under which the defendant
claimed.
Without much adieu, the Court launched into a discussion of
color of title, and arrived at an inferential decision that what the
Legislature intended to cover by the 10-year statute was the situa-
tion where a person had held the land under color of title. The
question which the court then faced was whether a void tax deed
constituted such color of title as the statute contemplated.
A. TAX DEEDS
Discussing the much-litigated question of whether a tax deed
void on its face constitutes color of title, the Court said in Power
v. Kitching that "there seems to be great unanimity in the hold-
ings that a tax deed regular on its face, even when voidable on
account of fundamental defects in the antecedent tax proceedings,
will constitute color of title within the meaning of the law gov-
erning the acquisition of title by adverse possession." '- The
Court added, "The cases are numerous which hold that an in-
strument void on its face for certain reasons may nevertheless
be good as color of title on which to found a claim of title by
adverse possession. ...
Referring to what constitutes color of title, the Court quoted
from Black on Tax Titles,13 which states that "Any instrument
having a grantor and grantee, and containing a description of the
lands intended to be conveyed, and apt words for their convey-
ance, gives color of title to the lands described," and further
states that "the courts have concurred, it is believed without ex-
ception, in defining color of title to be that which in appearance
is title, but which in reality is no title." 36
In upholding the claim of the defendant, the Court stated as to,
the facts in the case that "The deed in suit is one made prima
13. Id. at 261, 86 N.W. at 740.
14. Id.
15. Black, Tax Titles §287 (1888).
16. Ibid.
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facie evidence of title by statute. It has a grantor and a grantee.
It contains a description of the land, and apt words showing an
intent to convey. It came from an officer clothed with authority
to sell land for taxes and to give deeds therefor. We therefore
hold, under what we deem to be the better authority, that the
deed in question is a sufficient color of title upon which defend-
ant can build a claim of ownership by adverse possession." 17
The proposition that a void tax deed gives color of title seems
to have been settled by Power v. Kitching; but in Styles v.
Granger,8 the question arose as to whether or not a grantee of the
purchaser of a void tax deed secured color of title under his deed
where it was shown that the purchaser of the tax deed from the
county in fact received no title.
The facts of the case were that the property in question was
purchased from a county on October 3, 1887, by one Bowdle,
who on August 2, 1890, quitclaimed his interest to one Granger,
who was thereafter called upon to defend a quiet title action
brought by the owner previous to forfeiture for nonpayment of
taxes, from whom Granger had endeavored to secure a quitclaim
deed to perfect his title prior to the action, but after the 10 year
period.
The plaintiff contended that Bowdle had conveyed only such
title as he :had, and that he had none, so that there was no color
of title in Granger. The Court replied that, "It is equally clear
to us that the deed from Bowdle to Granger constitutes color of
title, and brings Granger within the terms of Section 4928. The
facts are almost identical in this respect with those in Power v.
Kitching. . . . The tax deed gave Bowdle color of title. His deed
to Granger was an assignment of whatever right or title he ac-
quired by tax deed. If the deed gave Bowdle color of title, his
grantor or assignee took the same title that Bowdle had held." 19
There was some question in the case as to whether Granger in
good faith assumed that his deed from Bowdle gave him title at
the time he purchased, in view of his subsequent attempt to se-
cure a quitclaim deed from the previous owner. The Court said,
"There is no suggestion in the record of any lack of good faith
on the part of Granger in his assumption that his deed gave him
title at the time he purchased," 20 and further that any conversa-
17. 10 N.D. at 262, 86 N.W. at 740.
18. 17 N.D. 502, 117 N.W. 777 (1908).
19. Id. at 508, 117 N.W. at 779-80.
20. Id. at 508, 117 N.W. at 780.
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tions or negotiations had in the case were after title had ripened
in Granger, and therefore immaterial/-t This being so, "the lan-
guage of the Court where it stated, "While it may be conceded
that the tax deed to Bowdle conveyed no title, yet the deed was
delivered, as was also the deed from Bowdle to Granger, before
the decision in Power v. Larabee "--' . . . was rendered by this
court, and the fact that both parties may have misinterpreted the
law prior to the decision of that case does not impeach their good
faith," 23 would seem to be dictum. None the less there seems
to-be the possibility of a showing that a grantee accepted a deed
on the basis that it conveyed no title to him and then set about
to secure title. In other words, it would seem the court did leave
the door open for a contention that the grantee did not claim
title in good faith and therefore did not secure color of title.
The Court again inferred that good faith is an element of color
of title when in Page v. Smith,24 in discussing the title of a holder
of a sheriff's certificate under a void foreclosure by advertisement
it stated, "That it (the original holder of the certificate) actually
asserted no title under its foreclosure is apparent from the fact
that it took no sheriff's deed for six years after sale, and that it
knew the foreclosure to be invalid. Of this and the fact that no
assignment was of record and that the foreclosure was void .. .
all subsequent purchasers had constructive notice, and are in no
better position than was the mortgage company." 25
There seems to be a decided split of authority as to whether
under statutes requiring color of title, good faith is essential to
the claim of right, title, or possession. Some courts construe good
faith to mean the absence of fraudulent purpose in the acquisition
of the color of title and the knowledge of a defect in the title
does not of itself evidence such a purpose; other courts require
an honest belief in the claimant that he has valid title.2 In speak-
ing of such statutes as this, many of the courts have held that
the requirement for the payment of taxes is a means of showing
the good faith of the adverse claimant.27,
21. 17 N.D. at 509, 117 N.W. at 780.
22. 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891).
23. 17 N.D. at 508-09, 117 N.W. at 780.
24. 33 N.D. 369, 157 N.W. 477 (1916).
25. Id. at 379, 157 N.W. at 480.
26. See 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, §§167-70.
27. See Note, 132 A.L.R. 216 (1941).
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B. VOID JUDICIAL SALE
In Page v. Smith, supra, a sheriff's certificate of sale was issued
upon a foreclosure by advertisement on the power of sale in a
mortgage, on June 4, 1892, and a sheriff's deed obtained in 1899.
In 1902 the title was conveyed to one Hill by warranty deed, in
performance of a contract of purchase entered into some two years
before. He in turn in the same month conveyed the property to
the Sioux Valley State Bank of Iowa, which in turn deeded to
the Bailey State Bank of Iowa, which transferred the property to
Joseph Know, who, in May, 1912, conveyed the property to the
plaintiff, who brought an action to quiet title.
The defendant, Smith, on January 4, 1887, secured the property
by warranty deed from the mortgagor under the foreclosed mort-
gage, and it was conceded that the foreclosure proceedings were
void and the Court stated that "so far as the record title is con-
cerned defendant Smith is the holder thereof .. ,, 28 In de-
ciding the case the Court found that there was no actual adverse
possession until 1907, and therefore only a six year period of adverse
possession up to the time when the action was brought. It natu-
rally followed that the Court found that constructive possession
was then in the legal title holder, Defendant Smith. The state-
ment of the Court quoted in the preceding section, to the effect
that the holder of the sheriff's certificate actually asserted "no
title under its foreclosure is apparent from the fact that it took
no sheriff's deed for six years after sale, and that it knew the
foreclosure to be invalid" 29 would therefore appear to be dictum,
as would its inference that there was not even color of title given
by the void foreclosure proceedings.
This inference came before the court in Steinwand v. Brown,30
where the Court was once'again faced with the question of a
void foreclosure under a power of sale in a mortgage. The Court
stated that "it is still true that one who goes into possession of land
under a sheriff's deed, issued in pursuance of a void foreclosure,
is in possession under color of title." 31
C. PAROL GIFTS OF REAL PROPERTY
In Urbanec v. Urbanec,3 2 the plaintiff and his father migrated
to North Dakota from Russia, and filed upon adjoining home-
28. 33 N.D. at 374, 157 N.W. at 478.
29. See note 25, supra.
30. 38 N.D. 602, 166 N.W. 129 (1917).
31. Id. at 610, 166 N.W. at 131.
32. 43 N.D. 127, 174 N.WV. 880 (1919).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
steads, between 25 and 30 years prior to the commencement of
the action. Because of his age the father was dependent upon the
son, and told the neighbors that he was going to vie the land -,o
his son. After the father received his patent to the land he gave
it to the son, but did not give him a deed or any other written
evidence of the transfer. He moved in with the son, who im-
mediately went into possession of his father's land and paid the
taxes for 15 years. The father died, and the son brought an ac-
tion to quiet title which was contested by the other heirs of the
father.
The question, in the opinion of the Court, hinged upon whether
or not a parol gift of real property could constitute color of title.
Citing Power v. Kitching, in which it was stated that the first requi-
site under the statute is that "the claimant must be vested with
some sort of title," the Court continued by saying that, "The plain-
tiff here does not claim to have been in possession under any sort
of title, but rather as a donee of an executory gift. The plaintiff's
wife, who was present when the patent was delivered, testified,
'my husband wanted him to give him some more in writing and
he said that was enough. He gave him the patent and he said
that was good.'" 33
Realizing that it was faced with a fairly close question, the
Court stated that, "The patent was, of course, not an instrument
of conveyance from the father to the son, and the change of pos-
session thereof did not invest the son with any title paper which
would serve in his hands to give color of title. It is unnecessary
here to determine all of the requisites that may go to make up
color of title, whether, for instance, it is necessary in every case
that there should be some sort of a paper title or whether one
going into possession in good faith, on the supposition that he is
the sole heir of the person last seised, might be considered as
holding color of title so as to draw to his possession the benefits
of the 10-year statute. . . . Suffice it to say here that there must
at least be presented that which, in appearance, is title, but which,
in reality, is not title." 
4
What the Court was really trying to distinguish was "claim of
title" from "color of title," and it went on to state that the "de-
fendants rely principally on the case of Rannels v. Rannels 3' . .
and other similar cases which define the term 'color of title' in such
33. Id. at 132, 174 N.W. at 881.
34. Id.
35. 52 Mo. 108 (1873).
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broad language as to include practically every transaction where-
by one may be put in rightful occupancy of real property under
circumstances entitling him, in good faith, to consider it as his
own. The Suprelne Court of Missouri, in a later case, Allen v.
Mansfield 36 . . . found 'it necessary to qualify the broad holding
of the Rannels Case, as appears from the following quotation 5rom
the latter decision: 'Claim of title does not necessarily include
color of title. The definitions and descriptions of color of title
given in the books are various and conflicting. It is, we ithink,
safe to say that any writing which purports to convey land and
describe the same is color of title, though the writing is invalid
and conveys no title.'" 37
This view by the Court-that to constitute color of title there
must be some documentary evidence-is apparently the majority
view of the subject.8 In its final disposition of the Urbanec case,
however, the Court granted the plaintiff the relief he was really
looking for, by construing the arrangement with the father as a
contract to convey, and holding that since the son had performed
his part by keeping the father during his lifetime, he was entitled
to specific performance.
D. TENANCIES AT WILL
In the Urbanec case, the Court was cited to a line of authority
to the effect "that one who enters upon real estate by virtue of a
parol gift, and who claims as owner, may claim the benefit of the
Statute of Limitations after he has been in the open, exclusive,
adverse and uninterrupted possession for the statutory period." 31
The Court said that this authority meant "that one taking pos-
session of land under a parol gift holds it adversely as to the
donor and all others," 40 but that "such parol gift conveys no title
and only operates as a mere tenancy at will, capable of revocation
or disaffirmance by the donor at any time before the bar is com-
plete." 41 The Court distinguished the authority cited on the
ground that it dealt with adverse possession under the 20-year
statute, and added that "it is well settled that color of title is not
needed where adverse possession under the 20-year statute is
relied upon. . . . Claim of right is essential, but not title, color-
36. 108 Mo. 343, 18 S.W. 901 (1892).
37. 43 N.D. at 132, 174 N.W. at 881-82.
38. See Note, 2 A.L.R. 1457 (1919).
39. Note, 35 L.R.A. 835 (1897).
40. 43 N.D. at 134, 174 N.W. at 882.
41. Id.
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able or otherwise." '- The Court concluded that the "plaintiff .. .
had no title which was capable of being protected by the 10-year
statute." 1:1
Of course the lack of any documentary evidence was considered
vital, but at the same time it would seem that a mere tenancy at
will is not sufficient to constitute a color of title which can ripen
into a greater estate.
E. UNPROBATED LOST WILLS AND UNRECORDED LOST DEEDS
Can an unprobated lost will or an unrecorded lost deed con-
stitute color of title?
In Stoll v. Gottbreht, 4 the Court did not answer the question
of whether color of title was furnished by such instruments, but
Justice Christianson in a dissenting opinion discussed the problem
at length.
The facts were that one John Kelly, three or four years prior
to his death, made a homestead entry upon the land in question.
He had made no final proof at the time of his decease and no
patent had been issued. He left a daughter, Mary Gottbreht, and
several other heirs, and in his will he devised the homestead to
his daughter and made specific bequests to each of the other heirs.
Mary's husband was named executor of the will. Several years
after Kelly's death the will was taken to an attorney for the pur-
pose of having it probated. The attorney, in due course, pro-
ceeded to lose the will and it was never presented to the courts.
After Kelly's death, however, Mary and her husband occupied
the homestead and made final proof and a patent was issued on
December 1, 1904, to "the heirs of John Kelly." Thereafter the
husband made a verbal agreement with his wife to pay the spe-
cific bequests and she then deeded the property to him. This deed
was also subsequently lost and never recorded. The husband had
been in possession of the land since 1903, having farmed it and
rented parts of it to others, and he continued to pay all of the
taxes. At the same time he made interest payments on the specific
bequests in the lost will. In December, 1916, he sent quitclaim
deeds to the other heirs to whom he had made the interest pay-
ments, with the balance due on the bequests. The other heirs
claimed this to be their first knowledge of any interest in the land,
and brought an action to quiet title.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 45 N.D. 158, 176 N.W. 932 (1920).
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The husband's defense was based on the 10-year statute. The
majority of the Court stated that, "It is deemed wholly immaterial
to consider whether the claimed will constituted color of title or
not. The only claim made by respondents is that it does consti-
tute color of title. Clearly the title of the defendant . . . rests
wholly, not only upon proper proof of color of title, but also upon
the fundamental requisites necessary to establish title by adverse
possession under the statutory provisions.... ."" The Court then
decided the case on the adverse possession feature of the statute.
Justice Christianson in his dissent argued that "the question
here is not whether there was a valid will, but whether the will
and the deed . . . gave a color of title upon which his (the de-
fendant's) claim of title by adverse possession . . . may rest." ,;
He went on to discuss what color of title is, stating that, "Color
of title has been said to be that which gives the semblance or
appearance of title, but is not title in fact; that which, on its face,
professes to pass title but fails to do so because of want of title
in the person from whom it comes or the employment of an in-
effective means of conveyance. . . . If an instrument actually
passes title, it is clear that it is not 'color of title.' The term im-
plies that a valid title has not passed. . . . A deed from a mere
volunteer is good color of title. A title founded on adverse pos-
session under a deed which purports to convey the title is wholly
independent of prior conveyances or of the grantor's actual title."
The majority of the Court, in deciding the case on the issue of
adverse possession, stated that, "Upon this record it is evident,
under well-established principles of law, that the defendant . . .
has not established the hostile adverse possession required under
the statute. After the patent was issued to the heirs, he had pos-
session of this land as a cotenant, by reason of the alleged deed
made by his wife, to him. As cotenants, the possession of one was
presumed to be the posession of all. In order to overcome this
usual presumption, and to start the statute to operate by adverse
holding, it was necessary for the cotenants, claiming adversely,
to perform or do some act in direct hostility to the claims of his
other cotenants, so as to show in some way an ouster of the rights
of such cotenants. This meant such an emphatic deprivation of
the rights of the cotenants, as to show either direct knowledge to
the other cotenants of such claim, or of circumstances sufficient to
45. Id. at 162, 176 N.W. at 933.
46. Id. at 170, 176 N.W. at 937.
47. Id. at 170-71, 176 N.W. at 937.
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establish such knowledge or the means of the knowledge there-
of." 4 The majority concluded that the defendant acted clandes-
tinely and that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of his alleged
hostile acts."
Justice Christianson in discussing the same point stated that,
"Where real estate is held in common, and one tenant assumes
to convey the entire estate and does convey it by metes and bounds,
the deed will give color of title as to the whole tract, and an entry
by the purchaser thereunder claiming title to the whole will op-
erate as an actual ouster and disseisin of the cotenant." 10 On
this basis, he continued, "it seems to me that the instruments, un-
der which the defendant . . . entered into and has remained in
possession of the premises, gave him sufficient color upon which
to build a claim of ownership by adverse possession. ... 51 He
criticized the majority for applying what he contended was the
"rule applicable to a case where one who has originally entered
into, and remained in possession of the premises as a tenant in
common, seeks to assert title by adverse possession against his
former cotenants." 3'2 "But the defendants in this case did not
enter into possession of the premises with the understanding that
.they were cotenants of the plaintiffs or anyone else. Mary thought
she held the whole title, and thought she conveyed the whole title
to William (her husband)." 53
F. TITLE PASSING BY hVIPLICATION WITH ADJACENT LANDS
Does title which passes by implication with adjacent lands
constitute color of title?
In Hille v. Nill, 4 one Nill purchased from the original owner
of platted property in the City of Kulm all of the lots except
one block. Three years later Nill made an ineffectual vacation
of the streets and alleys and fenced in all of his property. He
paid all the taxes until 1927 when an action was brought to
restrain him from closing up the streets.
The Court found there was no dedication to the public, as
the public had not accepted, but that there were vested rights
48. Id. at 163, 176 N.W. at 933-34.
49. Among the cases cited in support of this conclusion were Ildvedsen v. First State
Bank, 24 N.D. 227, 139 N.W. 105 (1912); Enderlin Investment Co. v. Nordhaugen,
18 N.D. 517, 123 N.W. 390 (1909).
50. 45 N.D. at 171, 176 N.W. at 937.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 172, 176 N.W. at 937.
54. 58 N.D. 536, 226 N.W. 635 (1929).
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in the streets and alleys vested in each purchaser of lots in the
addition. However, Nill claimed title under his deed and his
vacation proceedings. He had the premises fenced and excluded
all others therefrom. He paid the taxes on the property, and the
record being silent on the matter, the Court inferred it was taxed
as unplatted or acreage property. The Court stated that the
plaintiff, "under the circumstances disclosed by the record . . .
delayed too long in asserting his rights and objecting to the va-
cation. If any of his rights were abridged or destroyed by the
vacation he should have vindicated them at an earlier time. He
and his grantor were content to wait for more than 10 years
before attempting to assert or protect any rights they may have
had." ' The Court concluded that under the 10-year statute Nill's
claim of title had been sustained.
The "vested rights in the streets and alleys" which the Court
spoke of is in reality a right in the nature of an easement, and
the conclusion must be that the owner of the servient tenement
can use the 10-year color of title statute to clear his land of the
servitude.
C. CONTRACTS FOr DEED
Does a contract for deed give the vendee color of title?
In Clapp v. Tower," the Court cited with approval Pomeroy
on Equity Jurisprudence as to the relationship of the vendor
and vendee under a contract for deed, wherein it is stated that
"the vendor still holds the legal title, but only as a trustee, and
he in turn acquires an equitable ownership in the purchase money.
His property, as viewed by equity, is no longer real estate in
the land, but personal estate in the price; and if he dies before
payment, it goes to his administrators and not his heirs. In short,
equity regards the contracting parties as having changed po-
sitions, and the original estate of each as having been 'con-
verted'-that of the vendee from personal into real property,
and that of the vendor from real into personal." 57
Applying this doctrine of equitable conversion the Court held
that "where a valid and binding contract of sale of land has
been entered into such as a court of equity will specifically en-
force against an unwilling purchaser, the contract operates as
55. Id. at 547, 226 N.W. at 639.
56. 11 N.D. 556, 93 N.W. 862 (1903).
57. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §105 (2d ed. 1892).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
a conversion," ' so that the interest of the vendor for purposes
of probate was held to be personal property.
The North Dakota courts have always considered that the
vendee under a binding contract becomes the equitable owner
of the land, but that the legal title remains in the vendor, as
security for the purchase price. 19
In Miller v. Shelburn,0 the Court had occasion to consider the
extent of the relationship and stated in that case that "it was
contended that the plaintiff became vested with an equitable
ownership in the land upon the execution of the contract, and
that there could be no complete recission until he had conveyed
such interest back to the defendants. Equity does not so regard
the effect of such contracts. Under certain circumstances the
vendor becomes the trustee of the title for the benefit of the
vendee, and the vendee becomes the trustee of the purchase
money for the benefit of the vendor. But this doctrine applies
only in equity. Speaking of the effect of such contracts in law,
it is said in Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence §367:6I 'It is wholly
in every particular executory, and produces no effect upon the
respective estate and titles of the parties, and creates no in-
terest in nor lien or charge upon the land itself. The vendor
remains to all intents the owner of the land: he can convey it
to a third person free from any legal claim or encumbrance ...
In short, the vendee obtains at law no real property nor inter-
est in real property. The relations between the two contracting
parties are wholly personal.'" 62
Applying this holding in Cummings v. Duncan,"3 where the
Court was considering §7082, Revised Codes of 1905, which
provides for the lien of a judgment upon the real property of
the judgment debtor,6 4 the Court held that the section was "in-
tended to make a judgment a lien on the legal title of real prop-
erty, and not on some hidden equitable title, which could only
be brought to light and made available by the extraordinary
proceedings of a court of equity.""
In Salzer Lumber Co. v. ClaflinP6 where the vendee under a
58. 11 N.D. at 559, 93 N.W. at 864.
59. See Nearing v. Coop, 6 N.D. 345, 70 N.W. 1044 (1897).
60. 15 N.D. 182, 107 N.W. 51 (1906).
61. (2d ed. 1892).
62. 15 N.D. at 186, 107 N.W. at 52.
63. 22 N. D. 534, 134 N.W. 712 (1912).
64. This is now N.D. Rev. Code §28-2013 (194.3).
65. 22 N.D. at 538, 134 N.W. at 714.
66. 16 N.D. 601, 113 N.W. 1036 (1907).
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contract for sale entered into a contract for the purchase of lum-
ber for improvements on the contracted premises, the Court in
construing §35-1216,17 which provides that the lien of a me-
chanic's lien shall be "to the extent of all the right, title, and
interest of the owner," found that the "statute . . . in express
terms permits the lien holder to enforce his lien to the extent
of all the right, title, and interest of the owner. This precludes
the idea that there must be absolute ownership in fee before
the lien attaches." 18 This decision was made in the face of the
fact that the vendee had made no payment whatsoever under
the contract, and without any discussion of legal title as op-
posed to equitable title, as was pointed out in Cummings v.
Duncan, supra.
It can be taken as settled that the Court in North Dakota has
adopted the rule that in equity the vendee of a contract for
deed holds the equitable title to the real property and that the
vendor holds the naked legal title as trustee for the vendee,
but that at law the vendor remains to all intents the owner of
the land and that the vendee's interest is merely a personal one
arising out of the contract. In applying these rules in any situ-
ation in relation to a given statute, the courts are pretty much
at liberty to shift from one to the other.
In Robertson v. Brown,6 9 where the plaintiff in a quiet title ac-
tion was held to be the holder of a champertous deed,70 taken
from the owner of the property before it was taken by McHenry
County for the nonpayment of taxes, and the defendant was the
holder of a contract for deed from the county, the Court stated
that "presumptively the contract was valid on its face. Nothing
appears to the contrary in the findings. This Court, as well as
many others, has held that a tax deed valid on its face is suf-
ficient to constitute color of title and will, therefore, support a
claim of adverse possession. .... -71
In a note in American State Reports,7 2 following a report of
Power v. Kitching, it is stated that "a bond for a deed or title,
or an executory contract for the sale of land, after performance
on the part of the vendee and the accruing right to a deed is
usually considered sufficient color of title whereupon to base
67. N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
68. 16 N.D. at 605, 113 Ni.W. at 1037.
69. 75 N.D. 109, 25 N.W.2d 781 (1947).
70. See N.D. Rev. Code §12-1714 (1943).
71. 75 N.D. at 115, 25 N.W.2d at 785.
72. 88 Am. Rep. 701 (1903).
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the defense of adverse possession." 7' "However, if such bond
or contract is purely executory, entitling the vendee to a deed
at some future day in case of his compliance with certain con-
ditions, it is not color of title. It does not purport to convey ...
Though it has been held that one who enters into possession
under a contract of purchase with a bond for title when the
purchase money is paid is in under color as against a stranger,
though the purchase money has not been paid." 1- This seems
consistent with the holding in Power v. Kitching, wherein it was
said that to constitute color of title there must be a grantor and
a grantee, a description of the property and apt words of con-
veyance. A contract for deed does not contain apt words of
conveyance, but only an agreement to convey. However, in
equity it might well be said that the contract does convey an
equitable title, and support color of title on that basis.
In Corpus Juris Secundum it is stated that "it has been
broadly held that neither a contract for the purchase of land,
nor a bond for title constitute color of title under the law re-
lating to acquisition of title by limitation, although other au-
thorities are to the effect that a bond for title or written contract
to convey may operate as color of title against persons other
than the obligor, and it has also been held that after payment
of the purchase money an instrument of this character may be
a color of title sufficient to support adverse possession."
To say the least, such authorities throw nothing but confusion
on the subject when the other elements of possession are shown.
In Robertson v. Brown, supra, the Court stated that "The same
rule applies to the contract of sale of this property by the county.
F. C. Brown (the defendant) entered into possession under a
contract which the statute authorized. It vested in him color
of title and his possession thus became adverse to all claims of
the original owner or his grantees." 76 The Court has probably
gone quite a ways in stating that going into possession under
color of title is adverse to all claims of the original owner or
his grantees, as it would seem that the statute would not need
the words "actual, open, adverse and undisputed" if mere pos-
session were sufficient. What the Court probably meant was that
the possession of the vendee under the contract of sale in this
73. Id. at 719.
74. Id.
75. 2 C.J.S. 614.
76. 75 N.D. at 115, 25 N.W.2d at 785.
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case was adverse to the plaintiff insofar as the champerty statute
involved in the case 7 was concerned, so as to make the deed
void as to the defendant pursuant to the decision in Galbraith v.
Payne.T8 The question of whether a contract of sale vests in
the vendee such a color of title as is contemplated by the 10-
year statute as to the holder of the legal and constructive pos-
session still seems to be left open.
2. ADVERSE POSSESSION
The statute states that only those "who shall have been in
actual, open, adverse and undisputed possession of the land tin-
der such title for a period of ten years" shall have title.
In Power v. Kitching, supra, the Court stated that the claim-
ant "must occupy the land, under claim of title thereto, openly,
adversely, and exclusively for a period of 10 years." There does
not seem to be much question but that the nature of the ad-
verse possession contemplated by the 10-year color of title stat-
ute is the same as is contemplated by the other adverse possession
statutes, for in Page v. Smith, supra, where the Court was con-
sidering the case of a claimant under void judicial proceedings
in relation to the statute, it quoted from Johnston Land Co. v.
Mitchel, 79 to the effect that "It is undisputed that the land was
wild prairie land without a vestige of improvement, and at the
most it is merely contended that the plaintiff's possession thereof
was constructive only and such as it would obtain by reason of
the fact that on a few occasions it entered into leases with third
persons authorizing them to cut hay thereon. Such acts fall far
short of constituting actual, open and notorious possession suf-
ficient to set the champerty statute in motion." 80 The Court
also quoted from the syllabus in State Finance Co. v. Beck,8
to the effect that "The occasional cutting and removal of hay
from unoccupied lands under a permit from one claiming title
adverse to the plaintiffs grantor is not sufficient to constitute
adverse possession so as to avoid plaintiff's deed for mainte-
nance. ... 82 In Stoll V. Gottbreht, supra, the Court clearly fol-
lowed the rule applicable to the statutes of limitation generally,
that the possession of one cotenant is presumed to be the pos-
77. N.D.. Rev. Code §12-1714 (1943).
78. 12 N.D. 164, 96 N.W. 258 (1903).
79. 29 N.D. 510, 151 N.W. 23 (1915).
80. Id. at 528, 151 N.W. at 28.
81. 15 N.D. 374, 109 N.W. 357 (1906).
82. State Finance Co. v. Beck, supra note 81, Syl. 1.
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session of all, and that the one cotenant's posession does not
become adverse as to the others until some act of direct hostility
to the claims of the other cotenants is performed.
In Wright v. Jones,8 3 one Margaret McGibbney, in 1882, made
a homestead entry on a quarter section of land and took up her
residence thereon. Shortly afterwards she married John Wright,
by whom she bore two sons, one Arthur and a younger son.
Margaret died in 1887 and the younger boy was given away
and apparently disappeared. The husband continued to reside
on the property and two years later a patent was issued to "the
heirs of Margaret J. McGibbney, deceased." In 1890 Wright
placed Arthur with the Joneses and disappeared. In 1898 the
Jones family adopted Arthur, and several years later they lo-
cated Wright in Washington. The property was sold to the
county for nonpayment of taxes for the year 1889, and bought
from the county by one Lindwell. This caused a stir in the
community, and Lindwell quitclaimed the property to Mrs. Jones
on the understanding that she would keep the property for Ar-
thur. Mrs. Jones held the property and paid all the taxes thereon,
when in 1901, three years later, Arthur, then 17, ran away and
did not return until he had reached his majority, when he re-
turned and claimed the land. This action was started by Arthur
more than 10 years after 1901 for an accounting and return of
possession. The Court found the tax deed void, and was then
faced with the defense of the color of title statute.
The Court stated that under previous decisions the "defend-
ants, to recover, must show that for the full period of 10 years
they were in the open, adverse and undisputed actual possession
of the land under a color of title, and had paid thereon all taxes
and assessments. In this order of proof it will be necessary to
consider whether the Joneses took the land from Lindwell 'openly
adverse' to Arthur Wright, and whether for a period of 10 years
such possession was undisputed by Arthur." 84 After citing some
testimony which showed that Mrs. Jones was holding the prop-
erty for Arthur, the Court stated: "We are satisfied that the
extracts given will satisfy most minds that Mrs. Jones did not
assert any title hostile as against Arthur until after he had run
away, if she ever so asserted it. In fact it seems clearly estab-
lished that this good woman, either through love of the boy or
83. 23 N.D. 191, 135 N.W. 1120 (1912).
84. Id. at 196, 135 N.W. at 1121.
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through pride toward her neighbors, had assumed a voluntary
trust toward this boy and advanced the money from her meager
means to keep the land for him. After he had so ungratefully
run away, she may have decided to keep the land for herself,
and she probably has maintained an adverse claim against the
elder Wright and the younger son, but as against the one-third
interest of Arthur, we cannot see that she has established any
such claim. While she was under no obligation to assume such
trust, nevertheless, having so assumed it, she must account to
her trustee (sic). . . It is our conclusion then, that as against
this plaintiff's one-third interest in the land, defendants have no
right, title, or interest, and the trial court was right in quieting
such interest in plaintiff." 85
The Court did not decide the ownership of the other two-
thirds interest, beyond the dictum appearing in the quotation
above, except to point out that Arthur had no interest in it be-
cause if his brother was dead his interest would go to the father,
and there was not sufficient proof of the death of the father
to enable Arthur to claim any rights by inheritance from him..
But it would seem that if the Court was right in deciding that
the defendants were holding as trustees for Arthur, that they.
were holding all of the land as trustees for him, and the ques-
tion would appear to arise whether the trustees could not acquire
title under the statute for the benefit of the beneficiary.
One of the advantages of claiming adverse possession under
color of title-i.e., under color of some documentary evidence
or written instrument-would seem to be that it gives the claim-
ant a better claim of adverse possession as to all the property
described in the instrument. Under what are now Sections 28-0108
and 28-0109 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, per-
taining to adverse possession under written instruments, the Court
held in Gale v. Shillock,86 that possession of part of a tract under
a deed is presumed to be possession of all the real property
described in the deed. Section 28-0109 states that,
"For- the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any
person claiming title founded upon a written instrument or
upon a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been
so possessed and occupied in each of the following cases:
1. When it has been usually cultivated or improved;
2. When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
85. id. at 198-99, 135 N.W. at 1122.
86. 4 Dak. 182, 29 N.W. 661 (1886).
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3. When, although not enclosed, it has been used for -the
supply of fuel or of fencing timber for the purposes of
husbandry, or the ordinary use of the occupant; or
4. When a known farm or single lot has been partly im-
proved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have
been left not cleared or not enclosed according to the
usual course and custom of the adjoining county, shall
be deemed to have been occupied for the same length
of time as the part improved or cultivated, but when the
premises consist of two or more contiguous lots, the pos-
session of one lot shall not be deemed a possession of any
other of such lots."
In conclusion it might be said that there seems ample au-
thority for holding that the "actual,. open, adverse, and undis-
puted possession of the land" is generally considered the same
as under any other adverse possession statute or law, and that
this is subject to the general rule that the legal owner or record
title holder is -presumed to have constructive possession of the
property, and the adverse possessor must base his claim upon
an actual possession, and it will be noted that this adverse pos-
session must be for ten years, and that merely claiming title is
not sufficient, but must be coupled with adverse possession for
the full period of 10 years.
(To be continued.)
